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Introduction
1 In  this  paper  I  deal  with  the  changing relationship between a  land sector  NGO,  the
Provincial Department of Land Affairs (DLA) and members of a landless community in
Gasela, the Eastern Cape, South Africa. I try to explore why an experienced NGO depicted
the Gasela community as a potentially thriving agri-village once they would secure full
access to the land they had inhabited for decades. In doing so I show that an NGO is able
to engage in what I have termed : strategic translations. I aim to show how an organization
like the Monti Rural Association (MRA)2, quite pragmatically, adopted a political strategy
in which it became necessary to depict the Gasela residents - with few agricultural skills,
a lack of resources and a problematic history with managing a common resource - as
potential commercial farmers.  These rural dwellers - a rural proletariat ? - had to be
portrayed as  potential  farmers in order to convince the Department of  Land Affairs,
which had adopted the idea of economic viability as the most important criterion in the
late nineteen nineties, to transfer the land to the community.
2 In the process I show that I agree with an author like Nyamwaya (1997) who stated :
“while in theory communities are supposed to play a leading role in the health-
development process, the process is still largely controlled by government and NGO
development “experts” who do not allow communities to play major roles” (p. 184).
3 In my opinion, such processes of control also take place in the land sector in South Africa.
Through  research,  so-called  participatory  workshops  and  NGO  reporting  these
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Figure 1 : Gasela (Adapted from: Buckle, 1995)
 
 Gasela : an ‘abandoned’ farm
4 On the road from East  London to Johannesburg,  eight kilometres before the town of
Stutterheim - founded by German settlers - a large signpost to the left of the road points
to the Gasela railway station. A bumpy dirt-road not only leads to this small rural train
station but  also  to  Gasela  (See :  Figure 1),  a  farm that  was  once  called  ‘Mooifontein’
(Pretty  Fountain/Spring)  and  that  is  situated  between  the  road  and  the  railway.
Significantly, this railway line was once, in the nineteen-eighties, not only a boundary
between two parts of Mooifontein farm, but also the ‘international border’ between the
Republic of  South Africa and the Ciskei  -  a  bantustan were the people were brutally
oppressed (e.g. Manona, 1980).
5 One of the most remarkable features in the morning is the quiet. One hears the traffic on
the road, but the entire farm seems deserted. The colonial-style red-roofed farmhouse is
surrounded by a prison-like two and a half meter barbed wire fence. The gate is locked
and the house looks abandoned. The roof over the braai3-area has fallen down and the
garden is overgrown with high grasses and weeds. However, on closer inspection some
activity can be observed in the yards of the thirty odd ‘African’ huts and mud houses that
surround the farmhouse. A few women are hanging clothes to dry on fences, some are
cooking,  small  children  are  playing  in  the  dust.  Men  seem  virtually  absent.  In  the
afternoons, however, Gasela seems to come to life. The many children have returned from
school and usually the younger ones are playing soccer on a dusty patch in front of the
barbed wire fence, while young men practice rugby on a relatively well-maintained rugby
field next to the farmhouse.
6 What is surprising is the fact that few farming activities seem to take place. Yes, there are
several small well-kept gardens with maize, beans and pumpkins - one should probably
call them ‘subsistence’ plots - next to some of the huts. Furthermore, some cattle roam
the farm during the day and a few people keep chickens and pigs. But there is no sign of
intensive agriculture or stock-keeping. The fields lie fallow and are partly overgrown
with bushes and young trees and the cow sheds near the farmhouse are empty and look
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dilapidated. Moreover, apart from a broken-down tractor and an old diesel water pump,
all farm implements seem to have vanished. No ploughs, harrows, not even shovels and
hoes.  Walking  around  one  wonders  whether  this  is  the  farm  that  the  Monti  Rural
Association has described as a potentially thriving agri-village…
7 According  to  figures  presented  by  the  Monti  Rural  Association  218  people  can  be
regarded as Gasela residents4. Moreover, the Gasela settlement has 52 sites but only 30 of
these sites are currently occupied (MRA, 1997 : p. 11). In its 1996 report, Gasela Proposal to
the Department of Land Affairs, the Monti Rural Association (1996) is very clear about the
agricultural potential of the land and the wishes of the community :
“…MRA proposes that Gasela be treated as a pilot project for the establishment of
an  agricultural  settlement which  aims  to  meet  the  food  requirements of  the
community  as  well  as  provide  a  cash  income  which  provides  residents  with  a
livelihood…” (p. 8).
8 and :
“…The Gasela community is  a stable and cohesive community who want a rural
lifestyle where their main source of income is agriculture…” (p.9).
9 While concluding :
“The Gasela community should be given ownership rights to the land on which they
reside - Portion 1 of Mooifontein (89 ha)…” (p. 12).
10 However, the Department of Land Affairs seemed reluctant to transfer the land as it was
not convinced by the arguments in the MRA report. Therefore, the department demanded
follow-up research. This much more thorough research by the Monti Rural Association
(1997) was presented in the Report on Gasela November 1997. Now it was also the MRA that
critically queried the skills available :
“Although  there  are  different  interests  in  Gasela,  the  majority  of  respondents
prioritise agricultural enterprise, both as a productive option and in terms of the
settlement ramifications. Although there is some level of agricultural skill in the
community, especially in vegetable production and soil preparation, it should be
acknowledged that there is a shortage of the range of skills that is required for a
successful commercial enterprise” (p. 14).
11 Nevertheless, the Monti Rural Association, still saw a good opportunity for farming as it
expected that :
“…if  20  hectares  is  allocated  to  cabbages  and  20  hectares  to  potatoes  then  the
resulting estimated annual gross margin will be R320 974.005 per annum (…).
It is clear that the transfer of agricultural land to the Gasela community will lead to
a substantial improvement in their quality of life. In very hard, material term, if
one divides the projected cash flow by the number of extended households, then
each extended household will benefit by approximately R10 000 per annum…” (p.
25).
12 Thus, the organization still remained convinced, in its main recommendations, that :
“Gasela should be swiftly transferred to its residents” (p. 28).
13 As a social  scientist  and an agricultural  scientist,  I  felt  that  this  image of  Gasela -  a
potentially  thriving  agricultural  settlement  for  its  income  mainly  dependent  on
agricultural production - was not consistent with what I encountered on the farm. This
led me to seek answers to many questions. For example, what was the background of
these people, what were their experiences, as ‘a community’, with communal activities
and why were they not cultivating - or ‘ploughing’6 as the people themselves would say -
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the land on a larger scale? In order to answer some of these questions it is useful to go
back a few years.
A Short History of the Mooifontein Farm
14 Mooifontein, or Gasela as it is referred to nowadays, was a typical white-owned farm in
the sixties and seventies. The white farmer lived in the large 11-roomed house, while the
black farm labourers, with their families, lived in a cluster of roundavels7 and mud houses
at a distance of about seventy-five meters from the main house on a rocky patch of land.
The men worked as labourers while some of the women worked as a maid or a kitchen
help in the main house.  The baas8 was omnipotent in those days and ruled over the
workers twenty-four hours a day.
15 In April 1978 Ciskei Living Stock Board (CLSB) took over Mooifontein. In that period of
roughly two years the CSLB expanded the territory of the farm as it was intended to be
eventually incorporated it into the Ciskei, the new homeland in the making. Nevertheless,
in 1980, in preparation of Ciskei’s independence9,  it was decided that the railway line
would become an ‘international border’. The part of the farm that was situated on the
other side of the railway track became part of the Republic of Ciskei,  while the part
between the main road and the railway remained in the Republic of South Africa. During
this time quite a few Africans moved to the ‘good side’ of the farm in order to retain their
South African citizenship.
16 In 1980 the apartheid government - by all respondents referred to as GG (‘Gee Gee’), or
General Government - took control over the South African part of the farm. One of the
departments that arrived was ‘het Departement van Ontwikkelingshulp’10. It was the start
of a period of relative prosperity and an abundance of work for the Gasela dwellers, said
Mr. Vuyo Yako, a Gasela resident :
“…GG was very nice to us, they helped us with food and transport of sick people and
the rugby team and they employed us with about 500 other people…”.
17 However, for many others in the surrounding areas it marked the onset of a period of
great suffering as it was the time of homeland consolidation and forced removals. This
meant that many areas were cleared of the superfluous ‘blacks’ to create ‘all-white’ areas.
Those that were removed were consequently dumped in the bantustans. These new areas
of high influx were then serviced from Gasela by the South African government. It used
the farm as a base in the Republic of South Africa to ‘aid and develop’ these areas in the
Ciskei  -  across  the  railway  line.  According  to  Mr.  Vuyo  Yako,  this  programme  of
assistance involved, amongst other things, the building of houses :
“…the Department of Development Aid came to assist people that suffered without
houses. If people’s houses broke down, the government gave them tin houses…”.
18 It was all part of a political deal between homeland leader Lennox Sebe and the apartheid
regime where the latter provided much of the infrastructure.
19 As mentioned above, this period of prosperity and an abundance of work on the farm and
in the neighbouring areas led to a great influx of new labourers. Some of the new arrivals
came to settle permanently as Mrs. Nomntu Stuurman described :
“We came to Gasela and my husband received R. 300 per month, me 150 Rand. I was
working in the house of the umlungu11 (…) because I know the job of the kitchen (…
). We built a house (…) and we started ploughing a garden”.
20 However,  a  large  part  of  the  500 labourers,  who were  from different  tribes  like  the
amaXhosa, amaSotho, amaNdebele and amaZulu, did not reside on the farm permanently.
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They stayed in a camp of tin shacks that was built under the gum trees, while others
stayed on farms in the neighbouring areas. During this whole period the fertile farm was
cultivated to provide the labour pool with food. Crops like maize, beans and potatoes
were grown and the people who stayed on the farm were allowed to graze their cattle.
21 When, finally, in the beginning of the nineties, the winds of change began to sweep the
country  the  General  Government  was  no  longer  needed in  Gasela  as  the  era  of  the
bantustans was clearly coming to an end. Thus the white personnel with some of the
more skilled black staff, like truck and tractor drivers, were transferred to East London
and the tin shack settlement was destroyed when the labourers were sacked. The original
Gasela residents -and a few new arrivals that stayed- were left to their own devices and to
make matters worse, the community itself came under threat of removal. In February
1993,  when the last whites left,  the remaining labourers were told to leave the farm
within a month. However, one of the community leaders, Mr. Jim Dabani, who had lived
and worked in Gasela since 1983 as the foreman of the watchmen, decided to take action.
He went to the head office of the General Government in East London to complain about
the impending removal :
“…I told the man who was in charge, Mr. Jung, that I had heard that he wanted to
chase us off the farm. ‘Where must we go?’ I told him. ‘I know nothing about that’
he said. He then told me : ‘go back and count all the houses in Gasela and phone me
how many houses there are. Stay there…even if the police come to chase you, tell
them they must come to me’…”.
22 The community members also informed the local commissioner of police, as Mr. Vuyo
Yako recounted during an interview :
“When GG left (…) Mr. Greef, the commissioner of police - with Jim Dabani’s help -
came over and said : ‘don’t move, I’ll give you numbers until the government can do
something for you’”.
23 Although the remaining Gasela residents now had oral permission to stay on the farm, it
marked the beginning of a period of severe insecurity, complicated by the fact that most
people were now unemployed.
24 In that same year, 1993, the Department of Agriculture took control of the farm and the
situation became even more complex as  this  department leased the farm to a  white
farmer, a Mr. Steen. Instead of working together with the farm labourers, or properly
employing them, this farmer abused people and threatened the community. According to
community members he bossed people around, prohibited grazing on the farm, used the
occasional violence and threatened them with eviction. As Mr. Dabani described in an
interview
“Mr. Steen was bad. He threatened to shoot our cattle and bulldoze our houses…”.
25 During this initial period of threats and confusion several residents asked a white lady
from Kei Road who came to Gasela regularly to sell ‘utywala’ (alcohol), for advice. She
subsequently contacted the Monti Rural Association and passed on the request for help.
The Involvement of the Monti Rual Association
26 When  MRA  fieldworkers  arrived  in  mid-1993,  they  encountered  a  tense  situation.
Although two community leaders were active, there seemed to be little sense of direction.
Therefore, one of the first things MRA did was to advise the people to improve their
standard of organization. Moreover, the NGO helped them to establish links with other
structures to improve their capacity and strengthen their bargaining position. As a result,
the Gasela Residents Association (GRA) was set up which was, subsequently, linked to the
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sub-regional  committee  of  SANCO12 in  Stutterheim.  Furthermore,  the  Monti  Rural
Association attempted to mediate in the conflict between the lessee and the Gasela farm
dwellers.  However,  MRA also formally complained to the Department of  Land Affairs
(DLA) about the continuous harassment of the community by the lessee.
27 Nevertheless, the process was slow and it took several years for the situation on the farm
to reverse. One of the first victories was recorded in 1994 after Mr. Steen cut off the water
supply to the residents of Gasela. When MRA was informed about the matter they took
Derek Hanekom,  the newly appointed Minister  of  Land Affairs,  who was visiting the
Eastern  Cape  in  October  1994,  to  Gasela.  Hanekom  was  appalled  and  assured  the
community that they would not be evicted. He also took action with regard to the water
supply, that was reconnected shortly afterwards. For the members of the community this
was quite a victory. Not only had the Minister of Land Affairs personally visited Gasela,
his support also gave them a feeling that the balance of power was tipping. They felt that
they might be able to defeat  Mr.  Steen.  And indeed, the Department of  Land Affairs
eventually terminated the lease of Mr. Steen. Nevertheless, he was allowed to stay on the
farm as ‘care-taker’ until the department removed him altogether in 1996.
The Fight for Land
28 Apart  from  assisting  and  facilitating  the  establishment  of  the  Gasela  Residents
Association  (GRA),  the  Monti  Rural  Association  also  informed  the  people  about  the
possibilities of land acquisition. In a first attempt MRA helped the GRA to submit a land
claim to the Advisory Commission on Land Allocation13. One of the main arguments in the
claim, in the eyes of the community (and MRA), concerned the fact that :
“…the community has been settling on the farm since 1960…”,
29 and
“…they do not have any land to practice farming…”.
30 After a lengthy procedure,  in the course of which the Advisory Commission on Land
Allocation was succeeded by the Commission on Land Allocation and eventually by the
Commission on Restitution of Land Rights and during which time several new laws and
procedures evolved, the Gasela Residents Association received a negative response on
April 10, 199614. In short, the Commission on Restitution of Land Rights determined that
the people of Gasela could not qualify for a restitution claim as it did not concern land
that they had lost under racially discriminatory laws.
31 After  the  initial  disappointment,  MRA,  in  consultation  with  the  Gasela  Residents
Association, decided to pursue another avenue. Instead of a restitution claim, it was now
expected that the Land Redistribution Programme15 (Department of Land Affairs, 1997)
would yield the desired result. This programme was formulated to transfer white-owned
land to the black majority on a willing-buyer willing-seller16 basis. However, as the land was
already owned by the state, and no white farmer had to be compensated, MRA argued
that  the  people  of  Gasela  should  be  granted  the  farm,  so  that  they  could  use  their
settlement  subsidy  to  purchase  an  additional  portion of  land.  Therefore,  in  its  1996
report, Gasela Proposal to the Department of Land Affairs, that was quoted above, the Monti
Rural Association (1996) concluded :
“In summary, in the interests of regional stability and in line with DLA’s stated
priority of redistribution of state land, MRA proposes that Portion 1 of the farm
Mooifontein be granted to the Gasela community and that settlement subsidies and
the option of purchasing an additional portion of land be made available to them”
(p. 8).
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32 Following the submission of this proposal to the provincial Department of Land Affairs
(DLA), it became clear that the department remained sceptical about the transfer of the
land. Two major obstacles remained. First of all the director of the Provincial DLA, John
Carver,  who -until  a  few years  earlier-  had been the  director  of  MRA,  was still  not
convinced that the Gasela community had the actual will, the capacity, the skills, and the
resources  to  farm  the  land  successfully.  In  other  words,  he  had  doubts  about  the
economic viability of the plan. Secondly, a Stutterheim District plan was to be formulated
in order to investigate the settlement options for the wider region. In such a plan it would
be investigated whether various black communities would have to be amalgamated into
several  large  and  well-serviced  rural  settlements.  Therefore,  it  was  not  at  all  clear
whether such a District Plan would leave room for small autonomous agri-villages like
Gasela. Thus, in such a scenario, the Gasela residents might eventually have to leave the
farm in order to be offered housing in township-type settlements in the area. During a
meeting of Gasela stakeholders17 in August 199718 Mr. Carver referred to both obstacles : 
“We were not actually sure whether people would be actually interested in farming.
Moreover, it is necessary to look at the area in relation to the surrounding areas…”.
33 Later on in the meeting he furthermore stated :
“My personal guess is that we might have to think about three satellite settlements
in the area. In the end we might have to make some hard decisions…”.
34 Nevertheless, although the Department of Land Affairs was not at all convinced that the
transfer  of  land  to  the  Gasela  residents  was  desirable,  it  postponed  making  a  hard
decision since work on the Stutterheim District Plan would take several years. Moreover,
the Gasela residents had rights to stay on the land due to the Interim Protection of
Informal Land Rights Acts19,  that gave them short term tenure security. As the Monti
Rural Association did not share the apprehension of DLA, in regard to capacity, skills and
will  of  the  community,  the  department  -in  the  mean  time-  awarded  MRA  another
research contract to prove the contrary. That research, which built on the research in
1996,  yielded  the  Report  on  Gasela  November  1997,  that  was  quoted  above  and  which,
although more realistic  in regard to problems around lack of  agricultural  skills,  still
argued in favour of land transfer.
35 As could be expected, the Department of Land Affairs did not fundamentally alter its
position after it received the MRA 1997 follow-up report. However, the department did
make clear that it would not object if the community started cultivating the land in order
for them to prove that they could exploit the resources on the farm successfully. Over and
above the land on which they resided, the people of Gasela were also granted permission
to make use of another portion of the farm on the other side of the road. In this manner
the Gasela residents could use the time, needed by the departments to sort out all the
intricacies of the Stutterheim District plan, to demonstrate their eagerness and ability to
farm in order to convince the government. Subsequently, in early November 1997 the
Monti  Rural  Association  informed  the  Gasela  residents  that  they  had  permission  to
cultivate the land.
36 Consequently, rapid cultivation of the land became crucial for the people of Gasela and
for MRA. Why was it then that almost a year later the land had not been cultivated ? Was
it  a  question  of  lack  of  resources,  did  people  indeed  lack  the  skills,  or  were  there
community dynamics that the NGO might have overlooked ?
To Plough or Not to Plough…
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37 In August 1998, when the author was last in Gasela, the farm’s large fields yet had to be
cultivated. Although, as in other years, nearly every household had cultivated a ‘garden’20
,  not  one  of  the  larger  fields  had  been  ploughed,  either  communally  or  privately.
Nevertheless, the ‘ploughing’ issue was an important issue that frequently cropped up in
community meetings. Moreover, practically all the community members, who were active
in one of the Gasela structures, mentioned it as a priority; not only in their conversations
with outsiders. Then why was still no ploughing done ?
38 The most frequently heard explanations by the Gasela farm dwellers had to do with the
difficulty of finding a tractor for a reasonable price. For their private gardens people
usually hired a tractor from the neighbouring village as Mr. Xolani Dubeni explained in
an interview :
“Sometimes when we are going to plough, we ask a tractor to plough for us from
Ndakana21. A garden costs 35 Rand to plough. I sow the seeds myself by hand…”.
39 But according to Mr. Mbulelo Mfene this was not possible in November for the farm’s
large fields :
“In November we didn’t find a tractor, the Ndakana tractors were busy when MRA
came to give us this place (…).  We have no ox ploughs. If we have support,  the
government can borrow us a tractor. We did plough our gardens but that was also
difficult. It took place in the evenings (…), and on Saturday and Sunday. Costs are 60
rand for a small garden. People are waiting for their pensions. Few people work
here and there is too much weeds and grass to plough by hand…”.
40 Subsequently,  several  community  leaders  went  to  a  neighbouring  white  farmer  who
indicated  that  he  would  be  willing  to  plough  for  them,  as  Mrs.  Nomntu  Stuurman
recounted :
“We were preparing to plough but we were asking the white man to plough. He
wanted to charge 4700 rand, the second time we asked [it was] 5000 rand…”.
41 This clearly was an amount of cash that could not be raised by the community since the
main source of income is pensions and disability grants. In a last attempt - it was now
already March 1998 - some of the men, who worked for the Döhne Agricultural Research
Station, tried to borrow a tractor there as Mr. Mbulelo Mfene explained :
“I am busy to get a tractor from Döhne. We are waiting for April,  if  the Döhne
budget comes, they can plough for us…”.
42 But also this attempt failed and, thus, most of the farm remained uncultivated.
43 When analyzing these answers it becomes clear that community members view the lack
of access to a tractor as most problematic. However, several factors seem to be involved
in this lack of access. First, there seems to be a shortage of available cash. Although the
Ndakana tractors at face value seem much cheaper than the white farmer’s tractor, that
might  actually  prove  to  be  an  illusion.  Sixty  rand  for  one  tenth  of  a  hectare  (the
approximate size of a garden plot) also translates to 6000 rand for ten hectares. Such
astronomical amounts of cash are very hard to cough up for a group of rural dwellers like
the Gasela residents.  Second,  Mr.  Mfene also suggested that time was a complicating
factor. Not only were the available tractors busy on other fields during the ploughing
season, the community members also lacked the time during the week. Work in the fields
mainly had to be done in the weekend or in the evenings. This also suggests, as a third
factor,  problems  around  labour,  especially  during  activity  peaks.  Additionally,  the
conversations I had with people about the ploughing issue and the meetings I attended
suggested a ‘culture of dependency’. These were people who primarily seemed to look for
How to transfer and manage a public resource ?
Bulletin de l'APAD, 22 | 2001
8
help from outsiders when confronted with problems. In my view this was related to their
history as farmworkers and the general oppressive machinery of the apartheid state that
had marginalized them.
44 However, another factor also seemed to be at play here : the difficulty of managing a
common resource.  In  Hardin’s  (1968)  classical  article  The  Tragedy  of  the  Commons,  he
explains how herdsmen will keep as many cattle as possible on a common pasture. The
damage  done  by  adding  an extra  cow is  shared amongst  all  herdsmen.  The  benefit,
however, is mainly reaped by the individual. Eventually, according to Hardin, this will
lead  to  a  tragedy,  an  ecological  disaster.  Although  the  real  world  is  much  more
complicated Hardin’s model has helped to sensitize us to problems related to common
resources. In Gasela another - but related - mechanism seems at play, which may remind
us of the problems on the old Soviet collective farms : why invest privately - time, energy,
money or other resources - in managing a common resource, while others -even those
who invested less- will also reap the benefits.
The Women’s Project
45 Indeed, after having been in Gasela for several days, I discovered that there was a history
with managing a common resource in the community. My questions about the availability
of seeds and fertilizer prompted community members to mention the ‘women’s project’
which turned out to be an agricultural project located at the back of the main farm house.
To my surprise, such a project had never been mentioned in any of the MRA reports
about Gasela. It was a flat piece of land of about fifty metres long and twenty metres wide
that had been neatly fenced off and was overgrown with weeds. Although it had obviously
been a while ago, the land was once cleared of bushes. However, the seeds that were to be
planted had not found their way into the soil but lay in a dark cupboard in the second
kitchen of the farmhouse;  that is -  as was discovered later -  most of the seeds.  As a
researcher I hoped that this project could provide some more clues for the failure to
cultivate the large fields.
46 Several years ago, around 1995, a group of women from Gasela had been to a workshop in
Stutterheim  where  they  were  encouraged  to  start  an  agricultural  project.  In  my
conversation with Mr. Nakase, a local councillor in the Transitional Rural Council (TRC)
who represented Gasela in the Amatola District Council (ADC), he explained to me what
the  workshop  had  entailed.  According  to  Nakase,  the  national  and  provincial  ANC
Women’s League organized these workshops : 
“…advising women in the villages to start community gardens (…). We provided the
women  with  seed,  not  from  the  council  but  from  the  Lutheran  church  in
Stutterheim. We helped them distribute…”.
47 However, I could not discover any details about these workshops, nor could I find out
whether the women had been coached after the workshop. I suspect, however, that the
workshop  had  not  entailed  more  than  a  stimulating  speech  about  farming  and  the
handing over of the seeds, as the project almost immediately ran aground.
48 During my fieldwork in Gasela the following conversation took place when I asked Mrs.
Nomntu Stuurman, whether she was part of the women’s project :
“Yes, (laughing) we are ploughing a ‘useless plant’22,  we found the implement of
ploughing too late”.
49 For two years?
“I don’t know. The thing of many people is not right. Everyone has a different view
so it ends up in conflict”.
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50 What don’t people agree about?
“First the TRC23 gave us seeds, but the secretary of the women’s league took the
seeds for herself because we were not united”.
51 What do you feel when you see the land unused ?
“I feel unhappy… if we can sit down together and have a resolution of the matter,
then we can plough. I don’t know… my main thing is that I want us to be united…
All of us are involved, zonke24…”.
52 Other women also complained about the project. Moreover, some said that the secretary
of the ANC’s women’s league, Mrs. Nomphelo Mbutana, had ‘stolen’ some of the seeds for
her  own use.  According  to  some,  this  was  one  of  the  main  reasons  that  led  to  the
breakdown of the project.
53 However,  in  an  interview  with  Mrs.  Nomphelo  Mbutana  herself,  who  seemed  quite
annoyed, she explained that they had ploughed this year in the women’s project (which
was not the case) :
“We didn’t have money to buy seeds”.
54 Why did you not use the seeds that are available ?
“We have a problem of the residential committee and we don’t plant seeds because
of the rain. There was too much and we were too busy with our gardens…”.
55 For two years ?
[becoming quite angry] “I am asking you : your question is nice, but you can collect
all of us and ask us why we do not plough. It is better when everyone is present. We
started to collect ten rand of the people but not all of them wanted to contribute.
They said they don’t have”.
56 What do you think is the solution ?
“I said earlier that we went home to home to collect ten rand to plant… We want to
plough. But I promise you that this year we are going to plough…”.
57 Clearly, even in this small version of a communal agricultural project in Gasela there
were  conflicts,  irritations  and misunderstandings  around the  use  of  resources.  More
specifically, there was the obvious tension between the private and the common domain
that lead to distrust and tensions. The number one priority for every household is to get
its own garden ploughed and planted and only when that has been achieved can people
think about common agricultural goals. But even those goals are subordinate to private
goals  like  sending  children to  school  and clothing  them.  Undoubtedly,  the  ten rand
contribution to the project was too much too ask of many of the Gasela women.
58 What does the women’s project tell us with respect to the chance of success of an even
larger scale agricultural project ? First, it can be predicted that raising more than one
hundred  rand  per  family,  for  ploughing  alone,  will  be  even  more  difficult,  if  not
impossible.  Moreover,  if  there  are  already  problems  around  co-operation,  between
approximately twenty women in the women’s project,  would the participation of  the
whole  community  not  lead  to  even  greater  problems ? Although  several  people  are
enthusiastic, they are somewhat reluctant to invest privately in what is seen as a common
resource. This is explicitly illustrated by a statement by Mr. Vuyo Yako who explained
why people would be hesitant to use their own cattle for ploughing. Apart from the fact
that oxen are not kept anymore he stated that :
“People don’t want to use animals to plough, because it makes the cattle weak and
makes the meat not nice. That results in a low price. (…) I can’t give the community
my cow, if someone else uses it, they can hit it and push it so hard it can die”.
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59 Not only does the women’s project illustrate the difficulties of private investments in a
common resource, it also points to another set of problems in Gasela : weak committees
and weak leadership.
Organization and Leadership
60 Although the list of community structures established from 1993 onwards, like the ANC
youth  league,  the  ANC  Women’s  League,  the  ANC  ‘proper’,  the  Gasela  Residents
Association  (GRA),  the  Crèche  Committee,  the  Water  Committee  and  the  Police
Community Forum, seems impressive,  most of these structures are rather ineffective.
Moreover, the GRA and the ANC proper are one and the same and fraught with leadership
struggles during the past few years.
61 A residents association, affiliated to SANCO, is ideal-typically a civic organization that
unites people outside the sphere of party-politics. However, in Gasela there were no other
political parties active besides the ANC. As Lindile Msukwini, secretary of the ANC and the
Gasela Residents Association explained :
“The role of SANCO is to unite all organizations in the villages, but here we are only
one. The [ANC] meetings are every week but sometimes it skips a week when the
community needs to discuss something as SANCO. The ANC committee is the same
as the SANCO committee”.
62 He, furthermore, added :
“A village is no village without SANCO…”.
63 Thus, the committee that was the ANC in one week was SANCO in the next. Nevertheless,
although the committee seemed quite active and although there were no party political
struggles in the community, it appeared that a lack of experience, combined with a lack
of leadership left the community in a rather vulnerable position.
64 It appeared that a leadership vacuum existed since Mr. Jim Dabani, a vocal old man who
was the first elected chairperson of the GRA, retired in 1996 because of a severe illness.
His successor, Xolani Dubeni did not last long as Lindile Msukwini explained :
“…he was chair in 1997 after Jim Dabani, for about six to seven months. He was rude
in his position and used abusive language to older people in many meetings, [saying
things like :]  ‘I  am the chair,  so you must do a thing that I  like’  (…).  In a well-
attended meeting, of about 100 people, the people voted to take him out”.
65 Subsequently, Mrs. Nolindili Bhatyi became the first woman chair, although her husband,
who  is  a  church  minister,  seemed  to  pull  strings  in  the  background.  However,  the
committee  seemed  quite  directionless  and  Mrs.  Bhatyi  was  far  from  vocal  on  the
important issues. Mr. Dabani, somewhat bitter and rarely attending meetings these days,
felt that the GRA was rife with jealousy and that they are stupid and don’t do their job. In
fact, in an interview, he still saw himself as a leader :
“…when outsiders arrive, they still come to my place”.
66 Having spent time in Gasela during my fieldwork gave me the opportunity to discover
some of  the reasons why people found it  hard to start  ploughing the fields.  Lack of
resources  and  management  skills,  a  reluctance to  invest  private  resources  for  the
common good, organizational weaknesses and leadership struggles, all seemed to have
contributed  to  the  lack  of  progress.  Why  then  was  MRA  still  arguing  in  favour  of
establishing  an  agri-village  in  Gasela?  The  answer  can  be  found  in  the  changing
relationship between MRA and the Department of Land Affairs.
Locked in a ‘Market-Oriented’ Embrace
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67 In the early years of the transition to democracy, during the freedom and consultation era 25,
the new government and the NGO sector became very close and a new role for NGOs was
envisaged. For example, according to the 1996 Green Paper on South African Land Policy,
published by the Department of Land Affairs :
“The land reform programme emphasises the key role of the non-governmental
sector  in  supporting  rural  and  urban  development  and  land  reform  policies.
Organisations  in  this  sector  have  established  strong  links  with  communities
involved in land struggles and have been instrumental in enabling communities to
articulate their demands for land” (p. 78).
68 It  was  clear  that  DLA  acknowledged  the  important  role  of  land  sector  NGOs.  Thus,
especially with small communities like Gasela, most communication between DLA and
‘the people’  took place through organizations like the Monti  Rural  Association.  With
many of the larger communities the department itself had direct and regular contact.
69 However, after the new government had become more firmly established -partly due to
the brain drain in which the best qualified people had left the NGO sector to join the new
government-  it  retreated in its  original  niche.  Former comrades became government
bureaucrats -more loyal to their new employer : the government. Moreover, a new realism
discourse, inspired by the macro-economic strategy GEAR (Department of Finance (1998
(1996)) swept the country. By 1997, the feelings of expectation within the Monti Rural
Association with regard to co-operation with government had been replaced by feelings
of frustration. It seemed to them as if the Department of Land Affairs kept them on a
string, especially since their 1996 report on Gasela had been received critically by DLA.
Their  level  of  frustration  was  especially  high  because  of  the  fact  that  their  former
colleague and ex-MRA co-ordinator, John Carver, was now the director at DLA.
70 In the view of the new the MRA Director, Dudley Eastwood, there were macro-economic
issues at stake here. In fact, in late 199726, in a strategic planning meeting with his staff,
he stated that :
“…the basic assumption of the Department of Land Affairs is that giving arable land
to the poor leads to a waste of economic resources. Don’t be confused or idealistic
about land reform in South Africa, you have got to go back to GEAR to understand
why the department behaves like this…”.
71 Later on senior staff member Bongani Matsila remarked :
“For  Gasela  John (Carver)  seems to  push for  a  solution whereby people  will  be
placed in settlements with services and gardens…”.
72 This was the greatest fear of many rural dwellers. They would be rounded up from the
scattered patches of land where they lived, to be placed in rural townships where the
government could provide housing, infrastructure, services like water and electricity and
schools and clinics. However, Dudley Eastwood still saw a possibility to convince DLA to
transfer the land :
“We’re going for a major showdown with the Department of Land Affairs around
Gasela…”.
73 This ‘showdown’ would involve fighting the department on its own turf and in its own
terms  whereby  ‘economic  viability’  became  the  defining  notion.  Thus,  through  the
Department of Land Affairs the ‘new realism discourse’ also penetrated the work of the
Monti Rural Association. Subsequently, in this political game to convince DLA to transfer
the land ‘hard science’ became the political instrument. In this battle with DLA, MRA
would consciously move beyond the soft type of research they had conducted in the past -
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social  surveys,  community  skills  assessment  et  cetera.  The  management  team  was
convinced that only by adding hard facts - soil survey, labour requirements, predicted
cash flows et cetera - they would be able to convince DLA. A fighting spirit took hold of
the organization to ensure that  they found the right  arguments in facts  about  soils,
rainfall  and  production  figures,  against  the  background  of  images  of  a  community
consisting of rural agricultural producers in Gasela. As a result the ‘scientifically’ argued
Report on Gasela November 1997 was produced. Thus, the Gasela case became a mix of a
desire to regain lost prestige and respect of the Department of Land Affairs and a concern
with the plight of these rural residents. In this political struggle the plight of the Gasela
residents came to be reduced to a pragmatic and bare minimum : the transfer of the land.
For the time being it suited MRA, politically, to ignore the ‘social reality in the field’. The
number one priority became securing the transfer of land.
74 In this political struggle to convince DLA, the Monti Rural Association had to make use of
three ‘tools of translation’.
The Tools Of Translation : How Did Mra Create. The Image Of Gasela As A Potentially
Thriving Agri-Village ?
75 Intermediary  organizations  like  the  Monti  Rural  Association  engage  in  what  I  have
termed strategic translations.  As a go-between NGOs can manipulate the images that it
relays between the actors involved, in this case the people of Gasela and the Department
of Land Affairs. Three instruments were of importance to an intermediary organization
like the Monti Rural Association : 1. Their mode of research; 2. the method of interaction
with the beneficiaries through workshops; and, 3. The reports that were produced. These
instruments,  or ‘tools of translation’  were used in the political  process to attempt to
convince DLA of the need to transfer the land.
The Research
76 First of all, let us look at the research methods employed by NGOs. It is clear that research
in any context  should be critically  evaluated,  more especially  in contexts  where the
actors  stand  to  gain  from  the  results  of  the  research.  Many  non-governmental
organizations engage in research activities that are enveloped in the same ‘objective’ and
‘scientific’  formats  and  discourse  as  academic  research  projects.  However,  there  are
distinct  differences.  The  main  difference  is  that  the  research  conducted  by  NGOs,
frequently,  has an activist  purpose.  The research is  part of  a political  process and is
usually conducted to prove a certain point.  Although academic research may also be
influenced by those that pay the grants - especially in these times dominated by ‘market
thinking’-  academic  institutions  in  most  parts  of  the  world  still  try  to  protect  their
positions of scientific independence. NGOs, however, are less concerned with issues of
‘objectivity’. In fact, these organizations can be quite blunt about the way in which they
conduct research. I came across a clear example in a discussion with the Director of MRA
concerning  another  MRA  research  project,  that  I  was  involved  with  in  an  advisory
capacity. In his view, I approached the topic too academically :
“We are setting a precedent with this rights enquiry27. MRA has political objectives,
more than the Department of Land Affairs. Our research is not neutral research, we
need particular types of information…”.
77 This was also the case in Gasela.
78 The  Monti  Rural  Association  focused  strategically  on  the  economic  and  physical
intricacies of the plan in order to be able to convince the Department of Land Affairs that
was preoccupied by its own ‘economic viability’ discourse. This technocratic and (pseudo-
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)scientific approach, stressing agricultural production factors, was enhanced by making
use of images of the Gasela residents as rural agricultural producers. In much of Southern
Africa  such  images  are  used  by  the  development  industry  to  justify  agricultural
development  interventions.  Rural  residents  with  decades  of  experience  in  the  cash
economy and an urban outlook, are represented as ‘traditional farmers’. The persistence
of such images is related to a dominant and widespread belief that Africa is the one
remaining continent where man is still close to nature and ‘traditionalism’ is prevalent.
79 In my conversations with Gasela residents a completely different image came to the fore.
Most men and women had worked and lived all over South Africa in order to secure a
cash income. From Cape Town, to KwaZulu-Natal to Johannesburg, people, whether young
or  old,  had  worked  all  over.  These  were  no  traditional  farmers  but  a  rurally  based
proletariat (Bank, 1997).
The Workshops
80 The workshops conducted by MRA in Gasela were also instrumental in the NGO strategy
to create an image of  Gasela as a possible thriving agri-village.  As Pottier (1997) has
argued :
“participatory workshops remain structured encounters marked by hidden agendas
and strategic manoeuvres” (p.221).
81 In fact, standard interaction between NGOs and their beneficiaries frequently takes this
form.  Also  in  the  case  of  Gasela  interaction  between  MRA  and  Gasela  community
members mainly took place in this manner.  It  is usually a lively happening in which
information is gathered and disseminated. In fact, it is possible to distinguish between
two types of workshops :
• the information dissemination, or teaching, workshop ;
• the consultation and participation workshop.
82 In the first  type of  workshops community members  are  informed or  taught  about  a
diverse range of topics, ranging from information on what land reform entails to the way
in which community meetings should be conducted, or the way in which votes should be
cast during election times. The second type of workshop is the type whereby, under the
banner of ‘consultation’ and ‘participation’, the community is asked to share ‘its’ opinion
about a range of topics and participate in decisions. However, although both types make
use  of  dynamic  methods  of  interaction,  the  workshops  leave  much  room  for
interpretation, errors and, what I call, ‘strategic translation’.
83 The information dissemination workshops can be quite problematic, as it is usually the
NGO  that  decides  what  type  of  information  should  be  disseminated  during  these
workshops.  When very basic workshops are conducted about bookkeeping, or how to
conduct meetings, problems rarely occur. However, in cases where the NGO briefs the
community about important strategic issues, like for example around land, problems may
arise. As it generally is the NGO that holds the trump cards, the organization can easily
paint  a  picture  of  the  situation  that  strategically  suits  them.  Here  we  come  to  an
important point. The intermediary status of NGOs, especially in countries or areas where
‘the people at grassroots’, and often even the government officials themselves, lack very
basic knowledge, leaves room for these organizations to engage in, what I call : ‘strategic
translations’. In other words, as these NGOs are usually the link between ‘the people at
grassroots’  and  government  officials,  the  organizations  are  able  to  reformulate  -or
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‘translate’- the demands of ‘the people’ for the government departments they work with,
and vice versa.
84 This ‘power of translation’ can be even more problematic in the other type of workshops :
the consultation and participation workshops. In these workshops, where the NGO seeks
the opinion of ‘the people’, the capability of ‘strategic translation’ by NGOs becomes even
more tricky. This can be illustrated by the Gasela workshop of 20 November 1997. The
NGO is able to use its discretion, to ‘consult’ the community about certain topics, while
leaving other topics outside the consultation process. In this workshop -where the author
was also present- the results of the Monti Rural Association research project in Gasela
were  discussed  with  members  of  the  community.  Furthermore,  MRA’s  proposals
regarding commercial vegetable production were ‘workshopped’, as it is called in NGO
jargon. The workshop was attended by 53 people : 31 women and 22 men.
85 After presenting its research findings and tabling its land-use proposals the Monti Rural
Association staff asked the community to break up into three groups, or commissions.
The men, the women and the youth, then, proceeded to discuss the presented research
findings and land-use options. The men showed preference for both crops and livestock
farming, while preferring the crops with the highest returns : cabbages and potatoes. As
to livestock, the men indicated that they preferred cattle only,  which would be their
responsibility. The women also showed a preference for both livestock and crop farming.
However,  they identified  an additional  cash crop :  beans.  Moreover,  they  showed an
interest in a whole range of subsistence crops that they also deemed important : from
maize, to sweet potatoes and spinach. The youth preferred only crop farming, especially
cash crops like potatoes and cabbages and a few subsistence crops like maize and beans.
Furthermore, they felt that livestock should not be regarded as an option. 
86 At the end of the workshop Dwight Rover, the agricultural expert of the Monti Rural
Association, in a concluding speech for the community stated :
“…so, the option that we presented is all right. You’ve indicated that you want more
crops,  which I  think is  good.  We’ll  incorporate your ideas into the final  report,
which will then be presented to DLA. If they like it and agree that you can farm,
then we’ll recommend to DLA that the land is transferred to the community (…).
We’ll let you know as soon as DLA gives us an answer”.
87 Although  Mr.  Rover  did  indeed  acknowledge  the  inputs  made  by  the  community
members, and promised to incorporate them in the final report, he did not indicate in
which manner that would be done. However, his overall conclusion seemed to be that the
Gasela residents endorsed the plans presented by MRA. This ‘strategic translation’ of the
view of the community was even more simplified in the report about the workshop that
was attached as an appendix to the 1997 report.  In the conclusion the stance of  the
community members was rephrased as follows :
“The whole community are in favour of MRA’s research findings. Crop farming is
the top priority as it will alleviate poverty in the area. In particular, crops such as
cabbages and potatoes are seen as a realistic option…” (1997, p. 33).
88 In very clear terms this example shows how NGOs are able to strategically translate the
position taken by members of the community in a manner which suited the political
strategies of the organization. In this manner, two issues were left out of the conclusions :
what to do with livestock and how to incorporate a larger diversity of crops. 
89 Especially  ignoring  the  livestock  issue  can  cause  major  problems  during  the
implementation of the project. When discussing the issue of livestock in Southern Africa,
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one needs to be especially vigilant as cattle ownership means much more to Africans -
and the Xhosa - than a narrowly defined economic value, as was shown in Chapter 4.
Status,  lobola (bride wealth),  slaughtering for ceremonies,  and a form of  ‘traditional’
banking are some of the functions of cattle, besides the more direct values like milk, meat
or draft power. In other words, livestock, and especially cattle, constitutes a significant
part of the cultural fabric of society.
90 The Monti Rural Association plans did not acknowledge the livestock that was kept by the
most influential community members in Gasela. If we limit this discussion to the 62 heads
of cattle that were held on the farm, then there is no way that these could be kept on the
land if  40 hectares of cabbage and potato production would be realized28.  In its 1997
Report on Gasela MRA, therefore concluded that :
“…due to the lack of available area at Gasela extensive livestock production is not
recommended although it can be practised (…). If the livestock option is pursued
then it is recommended that cropping takes priority over livestock in terms of area
and land suitability. Livestock can therefore be grazed on any areas not suitable for
crop production…” (p. 22).
91 However, in the workshop on 20 November 1997, the organization chose to be rather
vague about the livestock issue. At no stage did any MRA member make it crystal clear
that a choice for commercial vegetable production would automatically imply doing away
with most heads of cattle. However, only five days later, in a stakeholder meeting on 25
November  1997  -with  possible  supporting  organizations  and  institutions  like  the
Department  of  Land  Affairs  and  the  Department  of  Agriculture  and  without  any
community members present- the responsible MRA staff  members explained that the
people would not keep any livestock on the farm :
“people will not keep livestock, but it is not clear how they are going to get rid of
the livestock that is present…”
92 Which caused Mrs. Mondli of the Amatola District Council to remark :
“don’t force your view on the community !”
93 Which led to a significant answer by Bongani Matsila, a prominent MRA staff member :
“we won’t, we believe in a participative process…”.
94 Then why was this fundamental issue of livestock keeping not thoroughly discussed with
the people concerned during the workshop in Gasela, five days earlier ?
95 This example shows that non-governmental organizations are able to reinterpret, adapt
and modify the information that travels ‘upwards’ from the field and ‘downwards’ from
the government. More especially in situations where ‘the people’ lack the background,
the knowledge, or the level of education, these consultation and participation workshops
can  be  reduced  to  ‘going  through  the  motions’.  In  such  instances,  the  so-called
‘participative process’ is like a play that is enacted, while having been carefully scripted
in advance. The outcome is already known, or at least highly influenced by the script
writers : the NGO staff. Thus, quite often, although ‘participation’ of ‘the people’ is high
on  the  development  agenda,  these  workshops  are  nothing  more  than  seeking
endorsement for intervention packages already outlined in an earlier stage by NGOs.
96 Another  issue  concerns  the  fact  that  the  number  of  people  who are  present  in  the
meetings  and  workshops  is  often  not  representative.  At  the  crucial  workshop  of  20
November, where the above plans were discussed, only 53 people were present, whereby
at least ten people were twenty years or younger. Considering the fact that 108 people
who are said to live in Gasela are above twenty years old, not even half of that adult
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population was represented at that meeting. On many occasions, during my fieldwork in
South Africa, I have witnessed many problems with quorums -too few representatives
present  to  make  a  democratic  decision-  at  workshops.  Consequently,  so-called
‘democratic  decisions’  are  actually  taken  by  a  minority  of  the  people  concerned,
frequently ‘the elite’. This calls for a critical evaluation. Do intermediary NGOs actually
work through democratic structures and are they the democratizing agents as is so often
claimed ?
97 In order to inform the Department of Land Affairs about the workshop results the Gasela
reports became crucial instruments.
The Reports
98 Not only the research and the workshops, but also the reports that are produced by NGOs
should be considered as instruments in a political strategy. Especially in situations like
Gasela,  where the government institutions have little or no autonomous contact with
communities,  the reports prepared by an NGO can become a crucial tool.  In fact,  the
reports to communicate with government agencies are what the workshops are in the
efforts to communicate with ‘the field’. A report is a locus of interaction in which NGOs
have the possibility to present their version of ‘reality’.
99 Especially in combination with the carefully scripted and translated results of workshops,
these reports become important tools in political processes. Within certain limits, NGOs
can use their intermediary position to ‘strategically translate’ both what is encountered
at grassroots and in government circles. Thus, as was shown in the beginning of this
paper, although MRA acknowledged the lack of skills and problems around management
capacity,  the NGO was able to stress the hard ‘technical  facts’  about soils,  crops and
climate in order to convince DLA that a land transfer would be the responsible thing to
do. Without these necessary strategic translation tools NGOs are bound to fail in their
political battles.
Conclusion
100 A land sector NGO like the Monti Rural Association is an intermediary organization. Its
position,  mediating  between  ‘the  people  at  grassroots’  and  other  institutions  like
government departments,  ensures that  its  staff  can engage in -  what I  have called -
strategic  translations.  This  paper  has  shown  that  the  choice  to  portray  Gasela  as  a
potentially thriving agri-village was a political decision by MRA, an NGO that had become
caught in the Department of Land Affairs’ market-oriented embrace. In the process of
translation the organization made use of three strategic tools : research, workshops and
reports.
101 In the research conducted by the NGO it was consciously decided to focus on certain hard
facts - climate, crop yields et cetera - and ignore others, like the livestock issue and social
issues. Subsequently, the workshop proved to be an ideal instrument to communicate
only  partially  with  community  members,  whereby  certain  information  could  be
disregarded. This shows that Pottier (1997) had a point when he argued that participatory
workshops are structured encounters in which hidden agendas and strategic manoeuvres
play a role. Moreover, it illustrates, as Nyamwaya (1997) has shown, that the participation
of communities themselves in development processes, although frequently stressed by
NGOs, may be minimal. Lastly, the reporting tool was used by the MRA to convey the
desired message to the government. The MRA reports on Gasela were clearly employed to
communicate certain facts to the Department of Land Affairs while ignoring other facts.
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In this case, for example, the reports made sure that the government was insulated from
certain contradictory data.
102 Possibly, the strategy employed by the Monti Rural Association may eventually result in a
land transfer  to  the  people  of  Gasela.  However,  NGOs  must  realize  that  the  process
leading to such a result produces the terms under which such a transfer will take place. In
my view, it is these terms which will ultimately determine whether the land will become
an asset or a liability…
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NOTES
1.An ethnographic account of the changing relationship between a land sector NGO, a
government department, and members of a landless community in the Eastern Cape of
South Africa
2.The Monti Rural Association was established in the early eighties as an anti-apartheid
organization, supporting communities that had been removed or were under the threat
of forced removals. In later years this land sector NGO became more involved in rural
development issues.
3.The South African word for barbecue, and a ‘white’ national pass-time.
4.Some of whom live in other places (like Johannesburg or Cape Town) for part of the
year.
5.Approximately $ 55 000.
6.The isiXhosa term ‘Ukulima’ is usually translated by Africans into English as ‘to plough’.
An English term which captures the meaning more fully is ‘to cultivate’.
7.The round ‘traditional’ African mud huts with grass roofs.
8.Afrikaans for ‘boss’ or ‘master’.
9.Although the apartheid regime recognized these homelands as independent states, they
were never recognized as such by the international community
10.Department of Development Aid. In a generator shed the sign ‘MOOIFONTEIN
departement van ontwikkelingshulp’ can still be found, used to patch up a hole in the
wall of the shed.
11.IsiXhosa meaning white person.
12.South African National Civic Organization: the ‘umbrella’ organization of South
African civics or residents organizations.
13.See MRA Gasela archive. Fax dated 28-10-1993.
14.See MRA Gasela archive. Letter ref: 6/2/2/d/63/0/0/6.
15.The South African Land Reform Programme consisted of three pillars: Restitution,
Redistribution and Tenure Reform.
16.Africans could access land sold by ‘white’ commercial farmers, using a settlement
subsidy of R. 1,500 per household. As a result many Communal Property Associations
(CPAs) were formed as about 100 households pooled their subsidies to buy one
commercial farm.
17.This was a so-called ‘stakeholder meeting’ in the offices of MRA. However, no Gasela
residents were present. Only the institutions that in one way or another dealt with
Gasela.
18.Meeting at the Monti Rural Association office on the 14th of August, 1997.
19.Act 31 of 1996: this act protects people with informal rights to land from evictions
during the period 1996-1998 when new legislation will be drafted and enacted.
20.Used in the meaning of small subsistence plot.
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23.Nakase’s Transitional Rural Council.
24.IsiXhosa, meaning : “everybody”.
25.In my view, the scheme ‘apartheid ‘ and ‘post-apartheid’ is not satisfactory when
analyzing the role of the ‘progressives’ in recent South African history. Therefore, I
propose to define three (partly overlapping) eras :
- the struggle era (1980s): the progressive forces like NGOs and underground operatives
of banned political parties were engaged in a ‘struggle’ against the apartheid regime;
- the freedom and consultation era (1993 - 1996): the transition period when the
progressive forces enter legitimate politics and a coalition was forged between state
institutions and non-governmental organizations. It begins when the parties agree on an
Interim Constitution in December 1993. The leading document during this period is The
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), produced by the ANC and its
progressive partners;
- the new realism era (post 1996): the Rainbow coalition falls apart as the National Party
withdraws after it has accomplished negotiating the Constitution. Important element: the
Property Clause. Does not want to be identified with progressive politics. Whites feel
betrayed by the NP as they lose their advantaged position. The alliance realizes that the
time of dreaming is over. Harsh confrontation with the global market. The alliance
published a new macro-economic strategy as the harsh confrontation with the world
market put the cabinet with its feet on the ground: the Growth, Employment and
Redistribution (GEAR) programme. It is criticized by the left as being South Africa’s
internal structural adjustment programme.
26.Strategic planning meeting of the Land Rights Unit, 03.11.1997.
27.This research project in the village of Mgwali would possibly become a ‘tenure test
case’ through which the government would learn about the intricacies of tenure issues
and overlapping land rights.
28. Only 21.7 hectares of forested and steep area would be available for cattle grazing 
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